Harrison answers critics

            “The regular troups who were in the engagement consisting of the 4th regiment of infantry, a few of captain Posey’s company, and some of the later captain Whitney’s rifle company, did not amount to more than three hundred men,… -- we would not willingly take from the merited applause of any individual, but we cannot refrain to express our belief that the dastardly conduct of some whole militia companies led to exposure, and consequent loss of the life of some of the militia officers. Whose men, deserting the lines, were seen behind trees and under wagons, where many were actually killed; for in a situation like that of the battle ground there was no place of real safety; … We hesitate not to assert, that the regulars sustained the principal share in the engagement.  They were by companies, ordered to different points, to support where the attack was most violent, or where the line became broken by the abandonment of the militia.  They were supported by the gallant Kentuckians, the brave Spencer’s company, and some others.  But their own efficiency in the action, taking into view the actual firing for the time, to say nothing of the charges made on the enemy, is justly considered as two to one; and it is but justice to the officers and men who were wounded, to say, that we have no conception of more determined bravery having been displayed on any occasion…”  From a letter written by Regular Army Colonel John P. Boyd to the Secretary of War on December 11, 1811, describing the Battle of Tippecanoe.
            In the two last articles, the controversy surrounding the Battle of Tippecanoe has been examined with particular emphasis on the disagreements between Governor William Henry Harrison’s political friends and foes.  There also were differences of opinion between some members of the Regular Army and other individuals in the militia units that took part in the fighting against the Indians.  Of particular note was the growing discord between Harrison, who led the army by virtue of his position as Indiana Territory Governor and commander of the Indiana militia, and Regular Army Colonel John P. Boyd, who was second in command.
            As the controversy spread, Harrison soon realized that he would have to counter the charges against himself and also the Indiana militia.  This defense of his reputation and that of the militia was particularly important if he was to be given an opportunity for further military command in the war with the British and Indians that seem imminent.
            Since the days of the colonial wars against the Indians and the French, political office and military command often had been interchangeable and actually beneficial.  (In the War of 1812 that soon was to follow, Governor Return J. Meigs of Ohio, Governor William Hull of Michigan Territory, Governor Ninian Edwards of Illinois Territory, would play prominent roles; in addition to Harrison, Hull and Howard also would become generals in the Regular Army.)         Partly in order to strengthen his position in Kentucky, the most populous region of the west, on December 13, Harrison took the opportunity to respond as follows to his good friend Governor Charles Scott, who earlier had written a letter requesting more detailed information on the battle:  “The idea seems to prevail in your state that in the action of the 7th u. the whole army was completely surprised and that they were placed in a situation where bravery only decided the contest and where there was no opportunity whatever for the exercise of military skill of any kind.  This was however far from being the case.  It is true that the companies forming the left angle of the rear line (Bartons & Geigers) were attacked before they were formed and that some of the men were killed in coming out of their tents but it is equally true that all the other companies were formed before they were fired on and that even these two companies lost but a very few men before they were able to resist.  Notwithstanding the darkness the order of Battle (such as had been previously prescribed) was taken by all the Troops.  The Officers were active the men cool and obedient and perhaps there never was an action fought where (for the number of men engaged) there were so many changes of position performed.  Not in disorder and confusion but with military propriety.  The companies of the Regulars and Militia were extended, contracted, wheeled, marched and made to file up by word of command.  My orders, and these were not a few, were obeyed with promptness and preciseness and if I am not more grossly deceived that mutual dependence which ought to exist between a commander and his army reciprocally felt. 
            “It has been said that the Indians should have been attacked upon our arrival before their town on the evening of the 6th.  There were two reasons which prevented this, first that the directions which I received from the Government made it necessary that I should endeavour if possible to accomplish the object of the expedition (the disposition of the Prophets force) without bloodshed and secondly-that the success of an attack by day upon the Town was very problematical.  . . . The orders given on the night of the 6th was solely directed to a night attack- the officers were directed in case of such an attack to parade their men in the order in which they were encamped and thus each Corps should maintain its self upon its own ground until other orders were given.  With regulations such as these and with such a state of discipline as we claim you must allow my dear Sir we had no reason to dread a “night incursion” more than an attack by day.  Indeed it was preferable because in no other could it have been so completely decisive.  In the latter we might have lost as many men as we did loose without having killed a third as many of the enemy….
            “P.S. I should have covered my troops every night with breast work of trees but axes were too scarce (after having procured everyone that the Territory afforded) that it was with difficulty there a sufficiency of wood could be procured to make the men comfortable-and the Militia were without tents and many of them without blankets.”
            In this letter to Scott, Harrison also enclosed declarations of support from Regular Army and militia officers that had fought at Tippecanoe. 
            On December 27, a dinner was given in Kentucky by the volunteers from that state that had fought in the Battle of Tippecanoe.  Among the formal resolutions passed were those supporting the actions of the militia and Governor Harrison.  Perhaps most significant for the future was the sentence, “…we are ready and willing whenever our country calls, to volunteer under the same commander….”